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Preface
This paper examines a proposal for the potential future structure for the Marine Corps Reserve that would optimize integration with the Active Component. As the Active Component of the Marine Corps attempts to innovate and reevaluates how it fights through plans such as EF21. The Marine Corps Reserve will be called upon to augment the Active Component wherever and whenever needed. With the lessons learned over the past decade of war, the Marine Corps is evolving once again and so too must the Marine Corps Reserve. This community of highly skilled citizens is a force that could be leveraged to augment a particular Active Component battalion and be a real force multiplier for an AC commander. Too long has the Reserve Component served without direction or a mission statement. The current structure of the Reserve Component is a mirror image of the AC but will never deploy as a division. The Marine Corps should reevaluate and then restructure this outdated system to suit best it is intended as an operational reserve. This proposal suggests a possible a model that is designed to provoke thought and inspire innovation.
This topic appealed to me because of my experiences dealing with the challenges and problems that plagued me while serving in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. My intention is to present a concept to inspire the leaders of both the Active and Reserve communities to change an archaic system, the reserves, and apply this proposal make those changes. By sharing my experiences and writing this proposal, I hope that I will stimulate discussion and possible solutions among the leaders of the Active and Reserve communities.
I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. Bradford Wineman, for his advice, guidance, and direction in my research, approach, and organization of this thesis.
Introduction
The US military has evolved the manner in which it employs its Reserve Components from its strategic reserve force to an operational reserve force. For the near future, the Reserve Components will continue its contributions as part of an operational force. This model began after the Korean War when the nation's Reserve Components were seen as a strategic reserve force designed to facilitate the rapid expansion of the armed forces for a major war with the Soviet Union. 1 Since the commencement of the Global War on Terror, the nation has used the Reserve Components with more frequency, but no formal, strategic reform of the reserve force has occurred since the Korean War ended. 2 The Commission on the National Guard and
Reserves (CNGR) released its final report on January 31, 2008 . The CNGR report recommended that to meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow, the National Guard, and Reserves should transform into operational reserves.
The CNGR report provides a road map for an active, viable Guard and Reserve
Components in the future, but it does not clearly discuss how each of the services should achieve it. 3 The Reserve component of the Marine Corps is an invaluable asset, one that has been called upon repeatedly for support and augmentation during many of the nation's contingencies. This component draws upon the skills of the men and women who serve in a multitude of capacities in their civilian careers and bring that expertise with them when they train or deploy. Since (OASD/RA), across the services the level of reservists participating and, in some cases, leading federal missions is increasing. 4 OASD/RA reveal that in the years preceding the attacks on 9/11, reservists contributed approximately 1 to 13 million days of work per year to their respective services. 5 Post 9/11, this number spiked to its highest point of 68.3 million days in FY2005 and has since then decreased to 25.8 million in FY2012. 6 The persistent mobilization of reservists to participate in operations emphasizes the concept that the Reserve Component has transformed. The RC's transformation from a strategic, last resort, reserve force of the Cold War era is no longer a valid form of employment. The RC is now an essential "operational reserve"
force for the military services, which demonstrates the need for a change or, at a minimum, a revaluation of current structure and employment. The increased use of the reserve forces to support overseas contingency operations (OCO) has transformed the Reserve Component. The RC's transformations from a "strategic reserve" to an "operational reserve" obliges' more than only a change in name, but a change in the organizational structure.
This thesis presents a model that, if implemented, would integrate the RC and AC. The proposed realignment would suit an operational reserve construct that would solve the ongoing challenge of achieving Total Force Integration (TFI). The proposal recommends using the infantry as a model to implement a new structure that would align reserve companies under active duty battalions, integrating the RC at a lower level than that of the strategic reserve. The realignment would prove to be mutually beneficial, allowing commanders to train a dedicated reserve force to the mission and needs of that particular AC unit. Likewise, the reserve company would benefit from having a dedicated relationship with an AC battalion and its commander.
The AC commander would provide the RC company with a mission to train to and provide it with current tactics techniques and procedures (TTP) to meet the commander's intent.
As the United States completes its mission in Afghanistan, the RC of the Marine Corps will continue to support its AC counterpart in fulfilling the nation's need; for protecting the homeland, building security globally, and projecting power and winning decisively. 7 The
Marine Corps must exploit the experiences it gained from a decade of war. These wars have forced the AC and the RC to work together and, in some instances, bridged gaps between the AC and RC. Seizing the opportunity of these experiences can increase the quality of retention and an opportunity to implement a change that will substantially integrate the two components of the Marine Corps. OIF and OEF have provided many lessons learned that were captured and, when used, beneficial. These experiences had been applied immediately to maximize their effectiveness in areas such as technology, equipment, and tactics for the troops. However, within the RC, the task of integrating the RC with the AC of the Marine Corps has encountered significant friction. Much of this friction resulted from poor apportionment of Reserve units and personnel to augment the AC in wartime with little to no opportunity to work together during peacetime. Although RC has been successful in augmenting the AC, it has done so in what many describe as a crash course or on the job-training environment.
The objective of this thesis is to stimulate a discussion among the senior officers of the This recommendation is aimed at bridging the gap between the AC and RC and making the RC and AC a more unified force that will meet the future demands of military operations.
Evolution of the Marine Reserve
To appreciate the RC, a brief reflection on its origins can clarify its intended purpose and current structure. as vital contributors on a day-to-day basis around the world." 16 In this instance, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs reinforces the need to identify that the role of the reserve force is changing. His statement lends credibility to the need to make changes to a structure that was implemented during an era in which a strategic reserve was appropriate.
However, it is no longer applicable for today's reserve force. 
Components of the Marine Corps Reserves
Title 10, United States Code, states the mission of the reserve forces are to provide trained and qualified units and individuals to be available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, and at such times as national security may require. 17 Three components comprise The Ready Reserve section embodies the complexities of one part of the Marine Corps
Reserve. With its multitude of components, understanding the RC is challenging to comprehend when juxtaposed to the AC. The AC's lack of understanding or difficulty in understanding the functioning elements of the reserve, its employment, and administrative needs reduces attempts made to integrate the RC. Subsequently, these lost efforts add to the difficulty in the integration of the RC and the AC.
Active vs. Reserve Culture
Significant differences exist in culture among the reservists and the active duty members.
Schein defines culture as "A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems." 24 Without question, the US military has its culture. The military culture primarily entails putting the unit and mission above personal and individual needs and desires. 25 Although military culture may differ from service to service, the underlining core values of discipline, obedience, courage, trust, and self-sacrifice are essentially the same. 26 Regardless of which branch of service, most members believe that the team or group is more important than is the individual. Self-sacrifice puts the unit and its mission ahead of the individual service member. 27 Self-sacrifice is evident when soldiers give their service at a personal cost to their family. This mindset of discipline, obedience, courage, trust, and self-sacrifice are deep-rooted and strengthened at the basic schools of each service.
However, a fissure does exist in the culture, a fissure that is apparent at the completion of basic training and the assignment to an active or reserve status. Most active duty members reside at their assigned military installation. Whether bachelor quarters or housing areas on the military post, the service members' neighbors are also service members. Being continuously co-located with others that share the same set of values reinforces these values and assumptions initial received upon entry into the military. Furthering this point, most of these individuals also work together, so they never break away from this culture. This culture is a way of life that includes the installation itself. 28 The active duty lifestyle promotes social cohesion at a larger, community level. For example, if the facility is threatened by hazardous weather, power outage, or a security breach, all of the service members and their families feel the effects. The reservists rarely experience this aspect of the active duty culture. However, the AC members do, because they principally live and work on or near military posts, and their sole livelihood, while on active duty, is to prepare for and perform the mission associated with their military occupation. As such, these service members are regularly exposed to the military's demanding influences.
Reservists do not have this environment of reinforcement as these individuals hold fulltime jobs with civilian employers or are students (full/part-time) who sacrifice additional time to reserve duty. Reservists are essentially civilians, and the opportunity to live on a military installation is rare. Reservists have to set temporarily aside this culture and adapt to a new culture. A culture that is more independent and relevant to their new lifestyle, whether it is as a student or as an executive. The reservist's exposure to this culture is on a limited scale, which is typically during their scheduled training events, which are approximately twelve weekends and two weeks per year. This equates to approximately thirty-nine days of training in any given year, resulting in a significantly fewer training and exposure than their active duty counterparts. 29 However, reservists who work typical 2,000-hour work years work only 1,920 of these hours because they are be involved in two weeks of training with the reserve system. 30 These same reservists put in approximately 304 hours of work time with the Reserve. Of the total hours worked by these reservists, under 14% of the time spent working was with their reserve unit. 31 Therefore, by necessity, these reservists must push aside the culture that is reinforced on the AC side. Additionally, the limited exposure to the military culture they do receive is from fellow reservists who have also placed other priorities before it. This is not to say the reservists dismiss the military culture, quite the opposite. During Operation Desert Storm, reports indicated that some reservists were suffering a loss of income due to military activation in support of missions.
This loss in pay from their civilian employee was in addition to putting their lives on the line alongside the AC members. and train them in the capacity that suits the needs of the command.
Integrating the Total Force
As mentioned earlier, the current construct of the RC is that of a strategic reserve designed to facilitate an immediate expansion of the armed forces for a major contingency. This plan revolved around a Cold War model. Although DoD recognizes the fact that it is now employing an operational reserve, the Marine Corps must seize the opportunity to make advancements towards disengaging from the Cold War model. The change from a strategic reserve and innovate a new model for its reserve force that will maximize the employment of an operational reserve. The key will be to incorporate its active and Reserve Components appropriately to achieve a Total Force Integration.
To bring about change for the future of the Marine Corps Reserve, a break from the old strategic structure is in order. Since the Korean War, reserve divisions or regiments have not mobilized in support of contingencies. Since 9/11, 100 percent of Marine Corps' RC battalion or squadron level commands have either been activated or tasked-organized as detachments in support of OIF, OEF or other OCO. 36 The most recent conflicts have demonstrated that the Cold War strategic reserve concept and its structure of forces are archaic and no longer valid.
Maintaining this structure will result in a costly maintaining of a force that does not facilitate an operational reserve and integrated reserve force to the AC. 
Part of the difficulties in attempting to have a Total Force Integrated Marine Corps is
dispelling the rumors and educating the AC members about the reserve force that stands ready to augment them when the occasion presents itself. Unfortunately, most of the AC members do not comprehend the role of the RC; this is in part due to its complexity. As described in the previous section of this paper, the RC of the Marine Corps has many facets, and may be difficult to work with when not accustomed to its needs. Additionally, the AC does not need to invest time and energy into learning about the reserves because under the current construct, it is a separate division; thus "not their problem" or "too high maintenance." The complexity of the RC without any requirement to deal with the RC on a daily basis cultivates as the negative connotation of reservists and their contribution to the Marine Corps as a whole. To achieve the desired effect of "Total Force," the AC must educate itself about the capabilities and limitations of the RC.
Training on a regular basis is one answer; however, unless a reserve unit is on the AC Table of Organization (T/O), an enduring and concerted effort to self-integrate from either the RC or AC will not be made. Additionally, commanders and senior enlisted have a significant impact and influence on perceptions that subordinates formulate of reservists. Most junior Marines will not even have an opportunity to work with reservists before they speak ill of them because their senior leadership has already spoken poorly of reservists. Lack of education, limited experiences, and the influence of senior leadership all play significant roles and have the potential to be obstacles or bridges towards the total force integration concept.
The Force Structure Review Group (FSRG) revealed the Marine Corps AC downsizing from 202,000 to 182,000 over five years, but no parallel decrease in the size of the RC. 37 As the Marine Corps continues reduce its size, it will lose valuable, skilled Marines who may choose not to transfer to the RC due to the stigma that has been placed on it. This stigma arises mostly because the AC and the RC do not train together regularly. Implementing the proposed model will expose these exiting Marines increasing their knowledge and understanding of the potential opportunities in the RC for themselves and for their Marines who would encourage transitioning into the RC. With more exposure to the opportunities to the RC, the Marine Corps Reserve may opt to become more selective with the Marines they select for continued serve in the RC. This is an excellent opportunity for the AC, and RC as the quality of the Marine Reservist could expectedly increase.
Integration of the two components will require time and a period of adjustment. If this period is rushed then, integration may not fully occur. As with any group, an adjustment period must occur. Bruce W. Tuckman's theory of group development claims that virtually all groups will pass through a series of stages. The stages he describes are formation (forming), conflict (storming), structure development (norming), productivity (performing), and dissolution (adjourning). 38 According to Tuckman, in the forming stage, the group members become oriented toward one another. In the storming stage, tensions may rise, and some level of conflict may present itself as members compete for status within the group. Tuckman continues by stating that these conflicts subside when the group enters the norming stage and becomes more structured, as standards emerge. As the group reaches the performing stage, the group moves past disagreement and begins to focus on the work to be completed. Tuckman completes the series with the group's continued ability to function together until it reaches the adjourning stage, at which time it disbands.
Although some degree of AC/RC tension is to be expected, all Marines should be treated with respect. The Forming -Storming -Norming -Performing -Adjourning model of group development is an excellent way to see what AC and RC units go through while under the pressures of preparing for combat. These phases are necessary and inevitable in order for a team to grow, to face up to challenges, to tackle problems, to find solutions, to plan work, and to deliver results. 39 To mitigate this, the AC and RC should be allocated the time to develop this relationship before entering into combat operations together. At the individual level, reservists tend to believe that active duty Marines do not accept them initially, but eventually, after passing through Tuckman's model they do feel accepted. Like all outsiders, reservists, and active units have to prove themselves to each other. Understandably, AC units will repeatedly cycle through some of these stages due to the nature of rotational billets and assignments. However, the RC units tend not to have such a rapid cyclic rotation in personnel because most members of the reserves force typically remain with the unit for their initial obligated term of six years. This stability allows the reserve element to bring to the table longevity and commitment.
Mission of the AC vs. RC
The goal of the Active Reserve is to facilitate the integration the Reserve Component (RC) and the Active Component (AC) so that when the time arises the two can work together as a Total Force. 40 The AR faces challenges in their ability to facilitate integration because the current structure in place is flawed. Integration is difficult when units are not only physically separated, but more importantly do not train for the same mission. The AC has its divisions 1 Although Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) standards are maintained in the RC, unit cohesion and, more importantly, the trust will not be achieved until after the RC unit is assigned to an arbitrary AC unit. The goal of any unit, regardless of the size, is to ensure that all of its facets are integrated to maximize its performance. DOD Directive 1200.17 recognized that the Reserve Components provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. 44 Not until an RC unit is assigned to an AC unit, whether platoon or battalion size, will it enter into Tuckman's group development stages and hopefully, yet doubtfully, be able to complete them before entering a combat zone.
At the individual level, reservists believe that active duty Marines do not accept them initially but do accept them eventually. Like all outsiders, reserve units had to prove themselves.
However, tensions sometimes went deeper, and reservists recounted many stories of put-downs and condescension by active duty Marines. Although some degree of active/reserve tension is probably inevitable, all Marines should treat each other with respect. From personal experiences as a reconnaissance platoon commander, two reconnaissance units were mobilized to augment an active duty reconnaissance company during OEF 9.2. The members of the AC unit were concerned that they had to work with more than (40) reservists. The concern stems from the thought that the reservists did not receive the same training and preparations as they had during the workup, would not be synchronized with the company, and AC boat spaces were given up for RC members. This concern was valid because the company did not receive the augmented platoons until approximately two months before deployment. Two months is barely enough time to meet the demands of the Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) and go experience the Forming, Storming, Norming, and Adjourning Stages. Defense Review (QDR) Report. 46 He continues to state that report identifies, "Prevailing in today's wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment." 47 This recognition and acceptance of the operational reserve has not come quickly or easily. The CNGR characterized this transition from a strategic to an operational reserve as "unplanned," but a necessity with no reasonable alternative that requires further scrutiny by the public and Congress. 48 The CNGR report added significant substance needed to support the legitimate need to embrace the concept of an operational reserve and to frame the consequential debates on the approach to implementing a force that is workable near-term and sustainable in the long term. 49 Winkler also mentions that, "at the same time, it should be noted that the establishment of an operational reserve can be seen as part revolution and part evolution." 50 This brings about the need for each service to bring forth their concept on how to evolve their strategic reserve concept into a functional asset that will complement and serve as an operational reserve. Developing an operational reserve structure from the lowest possible level, will allow for the most amenable application in change that can be applied, studied, and eventually implemented. In this case, the infantry reserve company and the infantry active duty battalion may be used to examine and eventually apply such as structure change. Reserve from a strategic to operational Reserve, as affirmed by our force structure review, expands our ability to perform as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness." Sharing the culture of deployment and an expeditionary mindset that has dominated Marine Corps culture, ethos, and thinking. Since our beginning more than two centuries ago, the Marine Corps Reserve is optimally organized, equipped, and trained to perform as an operational Reserve." 51 Recognition of the RC as an operational reserve is a step in the right direction. However, the problem is not that simple.
The Proposal
The current construct of 4 th Marine Division is structured to emulate the AC Divisions.
As mentioned, it is a strategic design that is no longer valid. This design was purposeful when subordinating RC regiments and groups to AC division general officers will facilitate integration. 54 Additionally, his recommendation suggests that the restructuring should be facilitated geographically. The example he provides elects the Mississippi River as the divider and that units to the west or east of it would fall under I or II MEF respectively. This proposed division will facilitate improved command and control. Although Major Riggs' perspective of the RC's disjointedness and outdated is accurate, the recommendation he provides is too vague.
His recommendation is broad and leaves many questions unanswered, but more importantly, it does not facilitate integration. Attempts to resolve the issue with integration at the bureaucratic level will only bring about bureaucratic solutions. Solutions that will only create busy work that gives the illusion of integration. To be effective, integration of an operational reserve that will foster a Total Force concept must occur at the lowest level. From this point, the Marine Corps can apply bottom-up refinement to improve the developing relationship.
This concept is best imagined by using the infantry as a model for the application and implementation. Figure 1 displays the current construct of a typical AC battalion. These companies will be distributed among the seven AC regiments, assigning each reserve line company to an AC battalion. The H&S and Weapons Company may be assigned to regiments.
As with any modification, not all the companies line up perfectly, and some modifications will have to be made so that each regiment and battalion receives reserve units. Under this construct, the I&I staff is a member of the AC staff and serves as an added support structure. To optimize efficiency, the I&I staff will be realigned under the S-3/Operations Office. This new relationship will ensure that the reserve company is conducting its training in accordance with the battalion commander's intent and reported on by an I&I staff on a consistent basis. Additionally, the I&I would serve as the AC commander's link to MARFORRES for the funding for his reserve company. For the reason that funding for the reserves is sourced differently than the AC the I&I will be a critical element in ensuring that the reserve company is employed and funded in accordance with the rules and regulations set forth in the MCO 1001r. In the case of a reserve weapons company, the weapons company either can remain as a weapons company or convert to a line company. In the situation of an H&S company, the billets of the company could be redistributed throughout a regiment to serve as augments. Although the reservist may take their commitment to the Marine Corps Reserve seriously and with dedication, the pay and benefits received do not cover the expenses to maintain a family or a palpable lifestyle. Therefore, his/her civilian career takes the priority. Although this situation is expected, it does equate to a lack of commitment, one that an AC commander could provide. Unfortunately, many a drill weekends there are many officers and senior enlisted that break from training to attend to civilian business-related matters. Unfortunately, this is expected because these senior officers and senior enlisted are peaking in their civilian careers and require their attention. Additionally, when the strategic concept was conceived, cell phones did not exist and progress in the civilian sector took time; careers were more stable too, with many people being employed at the same company for their entire careers. In this day and age, technology has reshaped society. These Marines should not leave the RC, quite the opposite. These individuals bring unique and valuable skill sets to the Marine Corps. What should occur, for the benefit of the junior officers and enlisted is to remove the opportunity of command past the company level in the reserves. Command at the battalion level and above, both the unit and members that compose it, ought to be led by someone whose job it is to dedicate himself entirely to that role. Field grade officers, not in command, and senior enlisted Marines should be given the opportunity to augment the AC regiment and higher staffs. Augmenting the AC regimental and division staffs with reserve members could reduce the demands of IA's in the future.
Opportunity Gained
Under the command of an AC battalion commander, a reserve company commander is given a mission, direction, and the latest information needed to accomplish the mission.
Incorporating the model at this lower level allows the reservists to collaborate closely with the AC members. At this lower level, integration is needed most. The AC battalion commander may now receive augmentation by a force that he can shape, train, and mentor. From the reservist's perspective, the company commander and his men will have access to fellow AC Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), Staff-NCOs (SNCO), and Junior Marine Officers (JMO).
Currently, only this level of access rarely exists. Where it does exist, it is due to the relationships built while on active duty. This experience will be lost among the officers ranks, as Second
Lieutenants may now enter directly into the SMCR without serving in the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF). Although this is an excellent opportunity for the SMCR, it will eventually lead to a gap in FMF knowledge and experience in the SMCR if the strategic reserve construct remain in place. If left in a strategic reserve environment, these young officers will mature in an environment with little to no fleet experience. Lacking these experiences these Marines will be expected to meet expectations of integrating with the AC without the benefit of fleet or AC experiences.
Officers, whose careers have only been in the RC, will one day be field grade officers leading Marines without ever undergoing the challenges of the FMF. Although there is no substitute for first-hand experiences, the proposed model in this thesis will provide young officers access to Marines, both enlisted and officers, on a familiar basis whom they can lean on for advice, assistance, and guidance. Under the current reserve force structure, it will only be a matter of time before young reserve officers will be asking for advice from their senior officers on situations they may have to face, but there will be no guidance to pass because they would have never experienced the FMF or had access to AC officers.
Staff officers and senior enlisted Marines (RC and AC) were in high demand during the OIF and OEF wars. These Marines served as members of a staff proving invaluable support to commanders and the operations being executed. Similar to the JMOs and NCOs these members of a staff need time to pass through the Forming -Storming -Norming -PerformingAdjourning stages but no longer as members of an RC unit but instead as staff augments to an AC Battalion, Regiment or Division. Although the new structure would seem to take away opportunities for reservists, in fact, it would provide opportunities to remain in the reserve forces, working alongside AC Marines without the obligations and commitments of command.
Serving as staff officers may not seem as appealing to some, but the benefits for the commands will be similar across the board.
Conclusion:
The Marine Corps Reserve has achieved many milestones since its inception. It has successfully supported many wars and contingencies that have validated its need. However, the time has come to integrate the Reserve and Active Components in a manner that will enhance a command's effectiveness, understanding and keep precious assets (personnel) in the Marine
Corps. The nation has evolved toward using the Reserve Components with much greater frequency than ever before but with no major reform since the end of the Korean War. 55 Reserve officers are no longer required to serve on active duty before entering into the reserve forces.
The Marine Corps must posture itself to leverage any advantage in a bid for continued success.
Within ten years, the Marine Corps Reserve will have field grade officers who have never served in the Fleet Marine Forces or combat. Without these experiences, it will be difficult to integrate the Active and Reserve Components.
Reserve units have played and will continue to play a critical role in the accomplishment of Marine Corps missions. Although the United States has evolved the employment of its
Reserve Components, its role as part of an operational force for the foreseeable future is secure.
However, the Marine Corps Reserve must adapt to the needs of an operational reserve concept and shed itself from the archaic strategic design. Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom proved that the ground and air units of Marine Reserve were critical to operations.
These operations further validated that 4 th Marine Division will not be mobilized as a division and this structure is no longer necessary.
As the Marine Corps innovates with such plans as Expeditionary Force 21, it will need to retain highly qualified Marines in the organization in preparation for future operational commitments. As a means to retain and recruit highly qualified Marines in the organization, and prepare for future operational commitments, the Marine Corps will need a more robust integration of its AC and RC. By using the infantry as a model, each element of the RC can align smaller units under Active Component units. Once in place, these units can be studied and observed for trends and deficiencies to mitigate and resolve before implementing this strategy to the whole Marine Corps. Ignoring this opportunity will only further divide the two components.
Implementing this proposal will place the Marine Corps Reserve ahead of its sister services.
The momentum gained over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan and other engagements around the globe continues to keep the Marine Corps Reserve in an operational mindset. This mindset and the actions taken demonstrate that the RC is fully committed and capable of being used in an operational construct, but the Marine Corps must provide it with a command structure to facilitate its continued success.
